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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-3862 
___________ 
 
RAYMOND FAWOLE,  
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
NEWARK BETH ISRAEL HOSPITAL 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-14-cv-01009) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kevin McNulty 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 1, 2017 
 
Before:  RESTREPO, SCIRICA and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 22, 2019) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Raymond Fawole appeals the District Court’s order granting 
summary judgment to defendant the Newark Beth Israel Medical Center (“the Center”).  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.   
 Fawole previously worked as a night supervisor in the Center’s Psychiatric 
Emergency Screening Service Unit (“the Unit”).  He was responsible for managing the 
flow of patients from the Unit to other units and for helping to develop treatment plans 
for patients.  In March 2012, Fawole was disciplined for violating the Center’s code of 
conduct; the charge concerned a loud and disruptive argument with a coworker.  This 
constituted Fawole’s final warning.  In December 2012, the evening shift supervisor 
complained to the Unit’s director that Fawole had screamed at him, using offensive 
language.  Due to this complaint, members of the Center’s human relations department 
began an investigation into Fawole’s conduct.  Two employees informed the investigators 
that Fawole regularly slept during shifts.  The investigators therefore reviewed footage 
from security cameras, which showed Fawole sleeping on January 10 and 11, 2013.  The 
videos also showed two other employees, who were under Fawole’s supervision, 
sleeping.  The Center gave the three employees the choice to resign or be terminated; 
Fawole and one other employee chose to resign, and the third employee was fired. 
 After resigning, Fawole filed a complaint with the U.S. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging that he had been fired based on age 
discrimination and that he had been retaliated against.  The EEOC closed the case 
without a finding of liability and issued a right-to-sue letter.  Fawole then filed a 
complaint in the District Court asserting claims of retaliation and age discrimination in 
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).  After conducting 
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discovery, the Center filed a motion for summary judgment, which the District Court 
granted.  Fawole then filed a timely notice of appeal. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise a plenary standard of 
review, and apply the same standard as the District Court to determine whether summary 
judgment was appropriate.  State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pro Design, P.C., 566 
F.3d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 In his brief, Fawole presents a single argument: that the District Court “did not 
consider the fact that the EEOC found [the Center] liable based on the charges of 
discrimination.”  Br. at 1.  However, contrary to Fawole’s argument, the EEOC was 
“unable to conclude information obtained establishes violations of the statutes,” and thus 
closed the case without finding the Center liable.  S.A. 58.  Thus, Fawole has provided no 
basis to vacate the District Court’s judgment.    
 While Fawole has waived any other possible challenge to the District Court’s 
judgment by failing to raise such a challenge in his brief, see United States v. Pelullo, 399 
F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005), we note that, on our independent review, we agree with the 
District Court’s well-reasoned analysis.  In cases like this one, where the plaintiff does 
not possess direct evidence of age discrimination, we apply the three-part burden-shifting 
framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  Willis 
v. UPMC Children’s Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 808 F.3d 638, 644 (3d Cir. 2015).  Under this 
test, Fawole bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.  
See Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003).  If he can make that 
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showing, the burden shifts to the Center to “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason” for its conduct.  Id. (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).  If the Center 
makes this showing, the burden returns to Fawole to show that the Center’s proffered 
reasons for its decision were pretextual.  See id. 
 As the District Court explained, even assuming that Fawole could make a prima 
facie showing of discrimination, the Center discharged its second-step burden by 
presenting a wealth of evidence establishing that it asked Fawole to resign because he had 
been sleeping on the job, taking unauthorized breaks, and failing to prevent his 
employees from doing the same.  This conduct was prohibited by the employee 
handbook.  Thus, the Center has identified a nondiscriminatory reason.  See, e.g., Reeves 
v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000); McNary v. Schreiber 
Foods, Inc., 535 F.3d 765, 769 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 The burden thus shifted back to Fawole to present evidence of pretext, which he 
could do by providing evidence that would allow a factfinder to either (a) “disbelieve the 
employer’s reason for the adverse employment action”; or (b) “believe that an invidious 
discriminatory reason was ‘more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause’ of 
the employer’s action.”  Willis, 808 F.3d at 644-45 (quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 
759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994)).  Fawole has not produced not a shred of evidence to make 
either showing.  He argued, in full, that he had been unfairly targeted, that the use of the 
surveillance cameras was somehow unfair, and that he was not actually sleeping.  
However, his personal view that his employer was out to get him does not suffice to show 
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pretext.  See Sarullo, 352 F.3d at 800.  His vague allegations that the Center somehow 
used the surveillance cameras improperly finds no support in the record.  See generally 
Berckeley Inv. Grp., Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006).  Finally, regardless 
of whether Fawole was sleeping during the relevant time, the pertinent question was 
whether the Center’s decisionmakers believed that he was asleep or otherwise derelict in 
his duties, see Willis, 808 F.3d at 648, and he has provided no basis to disbelieve the 
decisionmakers’ explanations.  Accordingly, we discern no error in the District Court’s 
disposition of his discrimination claim. 
 Fawole also alleged that the Center retaliated against him.  To make a prima facie 
case of retaliation, Fawole was required to show that (1) he engaged in “protected 
employee activity,” (2) that he was “subject to adverse action by the employer either 
subsequent to or contemporaneous with the protected activity,” and (3) that there was a 
causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.  Fasold v. 
Justice, 409 F.3d 178, 188 (3d Cir. 2005).  The only protected activity that Fawole has 
identified was his filing an EEOC complaint.  That complaint, however, postdated (and in 
fact concerned) his forced resignation, and thus cannot sustain his retaliation claim.   
 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.1   
 
 
                                              
1 Because Fawole’s claims lack merit, the District Court did not err in denying his motion 
for appointment of counsel.  See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993). 
